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Abstract
This paper motivates the choice of the functional comparative method to research the issue 
of civil remedies for international corruption. It shows how the social, economic and political 
factors that have shaped the normative context of the research question point to the functional 
comparative method as an appropriate methodology. The paper suggests that this method of 
legal research is able to meet the challenges inherent in the cross-cultural analysis required in 
the case of issues with an international dimension. The paper also argues that the use of the 
functional comparative method provides a perspective on the larger issue of rule making in a 
globalised world, by providing an element of predictability in the search for ‘common rules’ 
of interaction. Furthermore, the functional comparison of responses of legal systems to the 
question of civil remedies for international corruption provides a window on the possibilities 
that exist for legal reform and development.
1 Introduction
This paper motivates the choice of the functional comparative method to research the 
issue of civil remedies for international corruption. The particular advantage of the 
functional comparative method is that it focuses on the legal responses of states to 
common problems. In this view, the functional comparative method is not so much 
the study of legal rules in their historical, social or transplanted contexts but rather 
a means to acquire a better understanding of the legal responses that are likely to 
infl uence an eventual international consensus on the issue under consideration.
 To this end, Section 2 of the paper outlines the research question in its cultural, 
economic and political setting, recognising that these factors infl uence not just the 
choice of method, but also its process. Section 3 looks at the research question from 
its normative perspective and explains how the existence of a starting point, in the 
form of a consensus condemning international corruption, is an essential fi rst step 
that has created the normative framework in which functional comparative analysis 
on civil remedies for international corruption can be undertaken. Section 4 of the 
paper goes on to examine how the functional comparative approach addresses some 
of the methodological problems of translation that arise in researching matters with 
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an international dimension, such as the question that is the focus of this research 
project. Finally, Section 5 suggests that the focus on responses to shared problems 
that characterises functional analysis enables the anticipation of the ‘common 
platforms’1 of interaction that are capable of arising. It concludes that the use of 
the functional comparative method provides an element of predictability regarding 
the direction of reform and/or international regulation regarding the issue of civil 
remedies for international corruption.
2 The Research Question
About three decades ago, the Watergate scandal in the United States led to the 
passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).2 By creating a modality under 
which domestic legal structures are given the capacity to tackle corruption occurring 
in foreign countries, the FCPA changed the face of the fi ght against corruption. Its 
central idea of extending the repudiation of commercial corruption already found 
under domestic laws to foreign transactions has been replicated at the international 
level by an array of international and regional instruments.3
 The main approach adopted under the FCPA and the international regulatory 
framework has been criminalisation. This represents a signifi cant step in the 
fi ght against corruption. There is, however, some debate about its effi cacy. The 
Transparency International (TI) Global Corruption Barometer 2007 shows that half 
of those interviewed expect corruption in their country to increase in the next three 
years and think that their government’s efforts to fi ght corruption are ineffective.4 
In 2004, Tarrullo remarked that, despite the impressive institutionalisation of anti-
corruption obligations and programmes, ‘there is little evidence of any diminution in 
the incidence of corruption in, and by nationals of the … participating countries’.5 It 
would appear that this still holds true today.
 In the 1970s, when the FCPA was passed, the world stood on the threshold of far-
reaching globalisation and integration of world markets. At that time, the distinctions 
between public and private bribery, foreign and domestic bribery and criminal as 
opposed to civil approaches to tackling bribery were probably clearer. Today, the 
realities of international commerce and globalisation have made distinctions more 
nuanced. Globalisation is changing the frontiers of what used to be the realm of 
private as opposed to public law. As innovative strategies are employed to reduce the 
capacity of corporations and governments to profi t from corruption, the boundaries 
between civil, criminal, public and private enforcement in this area begin to coalesce. 
1 Almost fi fty years ago, Schmitthoff spoke of the emergence of a ‘common platform for commercial 
lawyers from all countries, those of planned and free market economies, those of civil and common 
law, and those of fully developed and developing economies…’. See C. Schmitthoff, ‘The Law of 
International Trade: Its Growth, Formulation and Operation’, in C. Schmitthoff (ed.), The Sources of 
the Law of International Trade (London, Stevens and Sons 1964) 3 at 5.
2 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq. (hereinafter, the “FCPA”).
3 One author comments that ‘to understand the FCPA is to understand the underpinnings of the larger 
international anti bribery scheme …’. See L.H. Brown, Bribery in International Commerce (Eagan, 
MN, Thompson/West 2003) 2.
4 See Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2007 (Berlin, 
Transparency International 2007) at 2, available at: <http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/
surveys_indices/gcb/2007> (accessed 9 June 2009).
5 D. Tarullo, ‘The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’ 
(2004) 44(3) Virginia Journal of International Law 665 at 666.
 THE CHOICE OF THE FUNCTIONAL COMPARATIVE METHOD 333
Research shows that there is increased participation of the private sector in the 
provision of security.6 It has indeed been asserted that ‘… states acting alone … are 
no longer a suffi cient means of producing security…’.7
 The question of civil remedies is particularly relevant because of the obligation to 
provide such a means of redress under the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention 
on Corruption8 and the UN Convention against Corruption.9 The Civil Law 
Convention stipulates that citizens should have the right to bring private actions 
for compensation for all damages suffered as a result of corruption.10 It establishes 
a general principle of liability of persons, as well as states, to pay compensation to 
persons who have suffered damage as a result of corruption.11 The UN Convention 
against Corruption establishes as a new principle of international law the direct return 
of illicitly obtained property through a combination of civil actions and international 
cooperation on confi scation.12 It also requires that parties to the Convention establish 
liability, including civil liability, for the offences of corruption established.13 
Furthermore, the UN Convention calls on states to ensure that entities or persons 
that have suffered damage from corruption have a right to initiate legal proceedings 
against those responsible for that damage in order to obtain compensation.14
 There is not much literature that addresses the complexities faced in the pursuit 
of such civil remedies, and this is due in part to the fact that up till now the civil 
action for corruption is an uncommon step.15 Yet, as has been pointed out, civil law 
consequences have the potential of being ‘surprisingly effective’ in the tackling 
of crime.16 The civil action enables the victim of corruption to seek recourse 
independently of the state. Civil remedies are in general subject to lower burdens 
of proof and focus on compensating the victim, providing restitution and denying 
unjust enrichment. In general, civil remedies can target not only the wrongdoer but 
also related persons or organisations.
6 Some authors have referred to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) as a ‘spectacular’ example of nodal governance that blurs the line between the public 
and private spheres and ultimately has global consequences. They state that ‘far from remaining in 
the realm of contract, under state regulation, the fi rms at the center of the TRIPS story are in essence 
wielding the power of state and international trade law through nodal means. Here the private sector 
steers and the state rows.’ See S. Burris, P. Drahos and C. Shearing, ‘Nodal Governance’ (2005) 
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 30 at 46-47.
7 L. Loader and N. Walker, ‘Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing’, EU Working Paper 
No. 2007/17 (European University Institute) 2, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1022882> 
(accessed 9 June 2009).
8 Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (1999), European Treaty Series No. 174 
(hereinafter, the ‘Civil Law Convention’).
9 UN Convention against Corruption (2004), 43(1) ILM 2004 at 37 (hereinafter, the ‘UN Convention’).
10 Art. 3 Civil Law Convention.
11 Arts. 4 and 5 Civil Law Convention.
12 Arts. 53-57 UN Convention.
13 Art. 26 UN Convention.
14 Art. 35 UN Convention.
15 In their study of thirteen OECD countries, Heine and Rose point out that the reasons for the reluctance 
to pursue civil remedies include: (1) rules that substantially limit the plaintiff’s possible claim; (2) the fact 
that damage claims must be brought in separate proceedings from criminal prosecutions; (3) damages 
do not adequately compensate for the costs of protracted litigation; (4) diffi culty in investigating and 
compelling production of evidence and witnesses in international cases; (5) showing damages with 
certainty and proving causal links; and (6) obtaining jurisdiction. See G. Heine, B. Huber and T. Rose, 
Private Commercial Bribery: A Comparison of National and Supranational Legal Structures (Paris, 
ICC 2003) 654-655.
16 Atiyah remarks that, while it is normally the function of criminal law to provide a deterrent against 
criminal conduct, contract law as an additional deterrent over and above that provided by criminal law 
can be surprisingly effective. P. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract (New York, Oxford 
University Press 1981, 3rd ed.) 255.
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 Another important advantage of the civil law approach rests on the fact that the 
proceeds of transnational bribery are often hidden in foreign jurisdictions using 
vehicles designed to break the chain of ownership. Civil law can pursue such moneys 
by tracing purported changes in ownership and piercing the veil of incorporation by 
undoing trusts and other arrangements that seek to preserve illicitly acquired assets 
within the reach of the perpetrator but outside the reach of the law.17 Again, civil 
judgments are enforceable against the defendant in any jurisdiction where he or she 
holds assets. These advantages are important in the context of the larger question of 
the fi ght against international corruption. Simpson concludes that ‘some theoretical 
and anecdotal empirical evidence suggests that civil justice processes may offer 
more effi cient corporate deterrence than the imposition of criminal legal sanctions.’18
 Berg highlights the potential of civil consequences for international corruption and 
laments that ‘… on the part of regulators there has been no recognition that improving 
and clarifying the civil law remedies … would do much to combat corruption.’19 
Burger and Holland give several examples of cases where corporations have pursued 
civil remedies against international bribes even without ‘direct statutory support’20 
and state that ‘the right of civil action provides a useful complement to criminal 
proceedings as a deterrent.’21 They argue that private actors, rather than governmental 
ones, are in a position to lead the next stage of the global fi ght against corruption.22 In 
a similar vein, Paul Carrington remarks on the weakness of enforcing anti-corruption 
laws by means of the very public servants that are a part of the problem and states 
that ‘… it is the integrity of governments that is the global problem in greatest need 
of a plausible threat of civil liability.’23 However, as Olaf Meyer points out, a review 
of the practices in several countries in Europe and the United States shows that ‘there 
is still no discernable systematic approach to the phenomenon of corruption … in the 
shape of a well-planned civil law strategy.’24
 These facts lay the groundwork for continued research into effective methods 
of tackling international corruption that can build on and augment the foundations 
established by the criminal law. This is the motivation for research on civil remedies 
for international corruption. What then is an appropriate methodology? The following 
section examines two preliminary questions in this regard. Firstly, what does the rule-
making process of the international trading society suggest about the appropriate 
approach to researching civil remedies for international corruption? Secondly, in 
the face of the multiplicity of values and traditions that characterise international 
society, what is the starting point of such research?
17 Kevin Chamberlain, for example, discusses the diffi culties faced by the Nigerian government in 
recovering moneys stolen from Nigerian citizens and deposited outside the jurisdiction of Nigerian 
courts by the former head of state General Sanni Abacha (now deceased) using foreign banks and 
various laundering schemes. See K. Chamberlain, ‘Recovering the Proceeds of Corruption’ (2002) 6(2) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 157-165.
18 S. Simpson, Corporate Crime, Law, and Social Control (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
2002) 78.
19 A. Berg, ‘Bribery-Transaction Validity and Other Civil Law Implications’ (2001) 1 Lloyd’s Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly 27 at 28-29.
20 E. Burger and M. Holland, ‘Why the Private Sector Is Likely to Lead the Next Stage in the Global 
Fight against Corruption’ (2006-2007) 30 Fordham International Law Journal 63-69.
21 Id., at 63.
22 Id., at 75.
23 P. Carrington, ‘American Law and Transnational Corruption: Is There a Need for Lincoln’s Law 
Abroad?’, in O. Meyer (ed.), Civil Law Consequences of Corruption (Baden Baden, Nomos Verlag 
2009) 37 at 49.
24 Meyer, above n. 23, at 18.
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3 The Research Question in Normative Perspective
A new society is emerging that defi es traditional state models of international 
politics.25 Cheap transportation, the Internet and direct access of individuals to each 
other has radically changed the structure of societies. The free fl ow of goods and 
services competes with the fl ow of organised crime, corruption and terrorism. Mass 
movements of people and the tremendous growth of industry have created great 
potential but have also been the harbinger of environmental pollution, pandemic 
risks, human traffi cking, global fi nancial distress and international corruption. 
Jobs are outsourced, corporations have divisions scattered over diverse continents, 
individuals have gone global and the world has fundamentally changed.26
 Providing solutions to issues that are transnational in nature, such as international 
corruption, have assumed a new urgency. The articulation of the rule of law27 has 
become imperative as the globalisation and integration of world markets makes 
national borders opaque. Our international law system, based as it is on states and 
territorial sovereignty, seems to be startled by this rapid pace of events. The rule 
of law is closely associated with the role of the state within its own territory and 
struggles with a ‘relocation’28 to the gap between states without descending into 
‘meaninglessness’29 or ‘mere sloganeering’.30
 Yet, never before in the history of mankind have we needed global rules as we do 
now. Problems assume an international dimension even as they arise and pose a far 
greater existential threat than they ever did. The ascent from chaos to order threatens 
to dissolve yet again into chaos if we experience system failure. Groups may opt 
out and seek their own solutions. Regardless of market advances, the gains of 
globalisation can be undone. A vacuum created by an incoherency in the rule system 
may lend itself to alternative ideologies, grabs for power, the rise of nationalism, the 
promotion of self-interest and a race to wealth by the strong and rich at the expense 
of the weak and poor.31 It is against this background of an urgent need for common 
rules in a global society that the issue of civil remedies for international corruption 
has arisen.
 The need to arrive at rules governing supranational problems implies the creation 
of international normative frameworks for interaction. How does the articulation 
of the rule of law take place? How do we fi nd solutions across legal traditions and 
25 Saskia Sassen speaks of how privatisation, deregulation and digitalisation have resulted in the 
weakening of the nation state, resulting in the need for the articulation of other spatial units that refl ect 
the ascendancy of globalisation. See S. Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press 2001, updated 2nd ed.) xviii.
26 In his insightful book, Friedman talks about the reality of a world that has become fl at as a result 
of globalisation with elusive national borders. T. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the 
Twenty-First Century (New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2005).
27 The expression ‘rule of law’ was coined by Albert Venn Dicey in his treatise An Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution (London, Macmillan 1959, 10th ed.) From Plato and Aristotle to 
modern day writers, the rule of law represents the essential idea that laws should govern societies rather 
than the arbitrary compulsions of men. As such, no one is above the law and good governance is best 
represented by a ‘government of laws and not of men’. See J. Adams, ‘Part the First: A Declaration 
of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’, The Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1780) Art. XXX.
28 Expression taken from the title of the conference ‘Relocating the Rule of Law’, held at the European 
University Institute, Florence, Italy, on 8-9 June 2007.
29 J. Shklar, ‘Political Theory and the Rule of Law’, in A. Hutchinson and P. Monahan (eds.), The Rule 
of Law, Idea or Ideology (Toronto, Carswell 1987) 1.
30 J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 195 at 195.
31 Trippe points out that there are already signs that economic distress is increasing nationalist fervour 
and political instability in hot spots including Pakistan, Turkey, Ukraine and the nations of Central Asia, 
Thailand and Iran. See J.E. Garten, ‘Stop the Free-Fall’ (22 December 2008) Newsweek 20-23 at 22.
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cultures? What methods can we use? To quote Teubner, ‘how can authentic law 
“spontaneously” emerge on a transnational scale without the authority of the state, 
without its sanctioning power, without its political control and without the legitimacy 
of democratic processes? Where is the global Grundnorm? Where is the global “rule 
of recognition”…?’32
 The ‘rule of recognition’ is found in the structuring of the society of trading 
nations. The internationalisation of world trade has created a space of interaction 
that is supranational in nature.33 In this space, the desire to exploit the potential of 
foreign direct investment has over the ages facilitated and provided an incentive 
for countries to comply with autonomous frameworks or ‘common platforms’ 
developed to protect and encourage investment.34 As such, in this society of trading 
nations, strategies have been employed for centuries that are aimed at facilitating and 
stimulating the growth of much-needed trade.35
 The society that exists in the gap between states, is held together by the dynamics 
of  mutually dependent relationships.36 The need to provide ‘common answers’ 
to shared problems is symptomatic of an increasingly integrated world market 
characterised by high volumes of trade accompanied by a mass movement of persons 
and goods occurring outside the domestic jurisdictions of states. These activities 
propel the need for accepted rules of interaction so that the associated societies can 
coexist in an effi cient manner. Considerations of pragmatism coupled with party 
autonomy result in ‘a self-validating legal discourse’.37 As Donaldson and Dunfee 
point out, international trade is capitalistic and opportunistic, yet it is predictable in 
its need for certainty that transactions will be honoured, contracts upheld, property 
respected and all of this in the absence of a supranational enforcing body.38
 International corruption occurs within the purview of international trade, an 
activity supported and encouraged by state interests yet carried out in the main 
by private actors. These private actors have fashioned a ‘common platform’ of 
interaction that caters privately to private interests and has drifted further and further 
away from the control of individual states in a process that proceeds on a ‘case-
by-case basis’ rather than as a ‘comprehensive system’.39 Teubner points out that 
32 G. Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’, in G. Teubner (ed.), Global 
Law without a State (Aldershot, Dartmouth 1997) 3 at 11.
33 Jessup spoke of a ‘law applicable to the complex interrelated world community which may be 
described as beginning with the individual and reaching up to the so-called “family of nations” or 
“society of states”.’ P. Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven, Yale University Press 1956).
34 A. Shalakany, ‘Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias under the Spectre of 
Neoliberalism’ (2000) 41(2) Harvard International Law Journal 419 at 422.
35 Blackstone wrote in his commentaries ‘… whereas no municipal laws can be suffi cient to order and 
determine the very extensive and complicated affairs of traffi c and merchandize; neither can they have 
a proper authority for as there are transactions carried on between the subjects of independent states, 
the municipal laws of one will not be regarded by the other. For which reason the affairs of commerce 
are regulated by a law of their own, called the law merchant or lex mercatoria, which all nations agree 
in and take notice of.’ W. Blackstone, J. Stewart (ed.), Commentaries on the Laws of England (Chicago, 
Callaghan and Co. 1872).
36 Velasquesz points out the importance of a core common morality as necessary for economic 
interaction. Without this, economic interactions would be ‘nasty and brutish if not short’. M. Velasquez, 
‘International Business Morality and the Common Good’ (1992) Business Ethics Quarterly 2 at 27.
37 Taken from the title of Part 1 of the book Global Law Without a State, Teubner points out that the 
‘lex mercatoria, the transnational law of economic transactions, is the most successful example of 
global law without a state.’ See Teubner, above n. 32, at 3.
38 In their ‘integrative social contracts theory’, Donaldson and Dunfee argue that ‘all particular or 
“macrosocial contracts” whether they exist at the national industry or corporate level, must conform 
to a hypothetical “macrosocial” contract that lays down objective moral boundaries for any social 
contracting.’ See T. Donaldson and T. Dunfee, Ties That Bind: A Social Contracts Approach to Business 
Ethics (Cambridge, MA, Harvard Business School Press 1999) at 6.
39 Teubner points out that ‘[t]oday’s globalization is not a gradual emergence of a world society under 
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‘the new living law of the world is nourished not from stores of tradition but from 
the ongoing self-reproduction of highly technical, highly specialized, often formally 
organized and rather narrowly defi ned, global networks of an economic, cultural, 
academic or technological nature.’40 He states that ‘global law will grow mainly from 
the social peripheries, not from the political centres of nation states and international 
institutions.’41 He argues that this ‘new living law growing out of fragmented social 
institutions which have followed their own paths to the global village seems to be 
the main source of global law.’42 He concludes that this implies that an adequate 
approach to the formulation of global law must be based on a theory that embraces 
legal pluralism.43
 In this society of trading partners, what is the most appropriate method of 
researching civil remedies for international corruption? An inward-looking approach 
that focuses on the position in a given legal system may be suitable for national 
problems and issues. However, with a supranational problem like international 
corruption, an inward-looking approach is handicapped by the limitations of national 
values and interpretations. In this view, a problem of international dimension, 
such as civil remedies for international corruption, requires an outward-looking 
methodology that can accommodate and anticipate an inherent plurality of meaning 
and interpretation. This suggests an approach that involves the comparison of more 
than one national system, which is found, for example, in a comparative legal 
methodology.
 Another reason to look beyond a particular legal system is the inevitable penumbra 
of uncertainty44 that exists in law. The gap between the law and the remedial needs 
of society requires that the law possess a certain fl exibility or indeterminacy so 
as to achieve justice in a particular case. This indeterminacy is inherent in the 
dynamics of growth and development. Just as this is true at the national level, it is 
even truer at the international level. Singer pointed out two decades ago that, if, as 
traditionalists propose, determinacy is a critical element of the rule of law, then ‘by 
their own criteria – the rule of law has never existed anywhere.’45 Indeterminacy 
implies that legal theories may lack comprehensiveness, may contain gaps and may 
be contradictory.46 In the fl uid dynamics of interactions of international trade, this 
penumbra of uncertainty is even more pronounced, legal theories are even more 
incomprehensive and the rule of law is very much a work in progress.
 However, Singer also points out that indeterminacy is balanced out by the 
consolidating effect of culture. He states that within a ‘particular culture’ the 
commonality of thought may lead to ‘shared understanding’ and predict the outcome 
of the judicial process.47 This idea of shared understandings that lead to predictability 
can also be applied to the particular culture that is thrown up in the gap between 
states. This gap embraces a plurality of legal traditions and suggests that, as regards 
the question on civil remedies for international corruption, a research methodology 
that addresses this pluralism should be adopted.
 Such an outward-looking approach that accommodates a plurality of diverse 
national systems is also supported by the fact that the international anti-corruption 
the leadership of interstate politics, but a highly contradictory and fragmented process in which politics 
has lost its leading role.’ See Teubner, above n. 32, at 5.
40 Id., at 7.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 H. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593 at 606-607.
45 J. Singer, ‘The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory’ (1984) 94(1) Yale Law Journal 1 
at 14.
46 Id., at 14-16.
47 Id.
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framework places compliance at the level of domestic legal structures. This grounding 
of enforcement at the level of the state implies a plurality of methods of enforcement 
in diverse systems.
3.1 The Normative Framework for Inquiry
An outward-looking approach must nonetheless proceed from a given starting 
point. The juxtaposition of the terms ‘international’ and ‘corruption’ throws up 
images of diverse traditions, cultures, peoples, values and norms, all fl ooded with 
a kaleidoscope of meanings. How does one arrive at a common understanding of 
this phrase? Corruption is commonly acknowledged to be a phenomenon with a 
‘multitude of faces’.48 It is a problem that dates back to ancient antiquity, and in 
almost every culture it is stigmatised as an illegal act.49 Yet, there is indecision about 
the ‘actual content’ or ‘nature’ of corruption. What is considered as bribery in a 
certain jurisdiction may simply be a legitimate business practice in another.50 The 
problem of cultural relativism would seem to militate against the emergence of a 
common, cross-cultural defi nition.
 What, then, is international corruption? This fundamental question defi nes the 
parameters of research into civil remedies for international corruption. Cultural 
relativism implies that a defi nition of corruption from within one tradition will not 
necessarily hold true for all. A defi nition that is valid for all cultures would have to be 
reached by a process of consensus and would have to assume a higher ranking than 
or even displace the domestic understanding. In the absence of such a supranational 
consensus, there is a ‘chaos of meaning’,51 and there would be no basis upon which 
to pose the question addressed in this research project on the potential and scope 
for civil remedies for international corruption. Simply put, there has to be a starting 
point, a normative rule that lends coherence, content and defi nition to the research 
question. In the absence of such a normative space, the question of civil remedies 
of corruption would not be ‘ripe’ enough to be asked. There would be no coherent 
starting point in a plethora of rules and values.
 The history of the international anti-corruption movement suggests that 
a normative space has been created that establishes the framework in which the 
research question on civil remedies for international corruption can legitimately be 
posed. The international movement to fi ght international corruption can be traced to 
48 E. Campos and S. Pradhan (eds.), The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the 
Sector Level (Washington , D.C., The World Bank 2007) at 9. The authors point out that the scale of 
corruption can be grand or petty and classify corruption into three broad types: state capture, patronage 
and nepotism, and administrative corruption.
49 Nichols shows that corruption is condemned in every major legal tradition including Buddhism, 
Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism and Sikhism as well as in most countries. See P. 
Nichols, ‘Outlawing Transnational Bribery through the World Trade Organisation’ (1997) 28(2) Law 
and Policy in International Business 305.
50 For example, the argument of counsel representing the giver of a US$2 million bribe in the 
recent case of World Duty Free v. Kenya argued that this was understood to be a ‘standard business 
practice’ that was part of the local Kenyan custom of ‘harambee’ which rendered the payment ‘not only 
acceptable, but fashionable’. See World Duty Free Company Ltd v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 2006, at para. 120.
51 Resorting to Wittgenstein, Hildebrandt writes about the relationship of mutuality between rules 
and action, stating that one does not precede the other. The decision that an act counts as a crime is 
dictated as much by the rule that governs our understanding of the crime as by the type of action that we 
understand as the crime. Hildebrandt emphasises that norms are implicit standards that rule our actions 
without which we would live in ‘a chaos of meaning’. M. Hildebrandt, ‘Trial and “Fair Trial”: From 
Peer to Subject to Citizen’, in A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. Marshall and V. Tadros (eds.), The Trial on Trial 
Judgment and Calling to Account (London, Hart 2006) at 15.
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a domestic law passed in the United States. The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA)52 has laid the foundations for the international criminalisation of international 
bribery. This domestic law not only articulates the notion of international corruption 
but also sets in place the principle of assuming jurisdiction over corruption that has 
occurred in foreign countries. The answer to the question regarding the source of the 
international rules on international corruption can literally be traced to this domestic 
norm.
 This FCPA was a response to the ‘moral outrage’ triggered by revelations to 
the American public concerning the events leading up to the Watergate scandal.53 
Investigations revealed disconcerting levels of corruption, slush payments and 
bribes paid by corporations to foreign offi cials.54 The public reaction and the political 
response ultimately resulted in the FCPA. The provisions of the FCPA criminalise the 
bribing of foreign offi cials, require corporations to keep fair and accurate books and 
records and put in place systems of internal control. The FCPA makes it unlawful and 
punishable by fi ne and/or imprisonment for a person to whom it applies, within or 
outside the United States, to seek to give a bribe with the intent of inducing a person 
to do or omit to do an act or to use his or her infl uence with a foreign government 
to infl uence any act or decision of such government so as to assist such a person in 
obtaining or retaining business.55
 The FCPA extended the scope of a US domestic norm to cover bribery occurring 
in different legal systems and cultures. It tackled the arbitrariness and inequality 
occasioned by differences in standards or interests by insisting that the same local 
US standard against corruption be applied equally to transactions occurring beyond 
American shores. In so doing, the FCPA set the agenda for the criminalisation of 
international bribery. A new normative framework was in the making.56
 The fact that only the United States had rules prohibiting international corruption 
placed it at a competitive disadvantage in the global market place.57 American 
companies were faced with a dilemma. To remain competitive, the choice was clear: 
either this new standard against international corruption had to go global or it had to 
52 See above n. 2.
53 Several commentators have described the chain of events that led from the Watergate scandal to 
the FCPA. See S. Sporkin, ‘The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act on its Twentieth Birthday’ (1997-1998) 18 Northwestern Journal of International Law 
and Business 269 at 271; S. Lochner, ‘The Criminalisation of American Extraterritorial Bribery: The 
Effect of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977’ (1980-1981) 13 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 645 at 645-653; J. Duncan, ‘Modifying the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: The Search for a Practical Standard’ (1982) 4 Northwestern University Journal of International 
Law and Business 203.
54 Lowell Brown, commenting on the Senate and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
investigations, remarks that the SEC investigation resulted in enforcement actions against United 
Brands, Gulf Oil Corporation, Ashland Oil Company, Boeing Company and Lockheed Corporation, 
among others, and that in all more than 400 companies admitted making overseas payments in excess 
of US$300 million and that 117 of these companies were in the Fortune 500. See Brown, above n. 3, at 
3-5.
55 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a) and 78dd-3(a).
56 This normative aspect is well illustrated by the severe criticism that was levelled at the US FCPA, 
which has been described as ‘misguided American moralism’. See J. Brademas and F. Heimann, 
‘Tackling International Corruption: No Longer Taboo’ (1988) 77(5) Foreign Affairs 17. Salbu has 
remarked that ‘… because the nuances of varying practices around the world must be understood in their 
cultural context, the FCPA’s bluntness subjects Congress’ efforts to justifi able charges of ethnocentrism 
and moral imperialism.’ See S. Salbu, ‘Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act’ (1997) 54 Washington and Lee Law Review 229 at 287.
57 Nathan comments that Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat is reported to have stated that US 
businesses lost contracts worth US$30 billion from mid-1997 to mid-1998 because of corruption. S. 
Nathan, ‘Tie Loans to Corruption: Weigh Bribery in Aid Decisions’ (17 February 1999) USA Today.
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be dismantled. With these trade concerns, the United States started an international 
effort to turn the American rule into the rule for all.58 A drive for consensus was born 
out of economic necessity.
 The moral outrage felt by the American public found no traction beyond its 
shores. Despite the almost universal existence of national laws prohibiting domestic 
corruption, the general attitude to commercial corruption occurring outside national 
borders seems to have been ‘anything goes’.59 A blind eye was turned to whatever 
it took to get the deal closed, to the extent that bribes were treated as tax deductible 
expenses in many countries.60 For about twenty-fi ve years, the Americans and their 
new normative standard were pretty much isolated in their position.61
 However, several factors have converged to reverse this indifference. The 
accommodation that corruption has enjoyed in international trade has dwindled.62 
The last twenty years have witnessed a shift in social, political and business attitudes 
towards international corruption. A number of reasons have been identifi ed as having 
led to this change of attitude. These include the end of the cold war; the increasing 
integration of Europe, the increase in international mergers, the recognition of the 
economic costs of corruption and the emergence of a borderless global market.63 
Also key are the links that have been made between international corruption and the 
lack of sustainable development, poverty and organised crime.64
 Furthermore, the fact that, in a globalised world, the effects of the consequences 
of international corruption, such as poverty and crime, do not stay safely within one 
jurisdiction but migrate with the fl ow of goods and markets across the globe, in the 
form of brain drain, money laundering, refugees, disease and confl ict, has increased 
the sensitivity towards this issue. The repudiation and moral outrage felt by the 
American people against foreign corruption was transformed into an economic, 
social and political issue of international dimension.
 The fi rst step of the move towards consensus was the stigmatisation of international 
corruption as a violation of the norms that coexist for the good of the society.65 The 
establishment of a base line of legality or common rule is the fi rst requirement of 
58 D. Gantz, ‘Globalizing Sanctions against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a New International 
Legal Consensus’ (1998) 18 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 457 at 466-468.
59 Vogel notes that ‘many corporations have been paying bribes around the world for decades.’ See 
F. Vogel, ‘The Supply Side of Global Bribery’ (1998) 35(2) Finance and Development 30 at 33.
60 In response to this practice, the OECD passed the Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of 
Bribes to Foreign Public Offi cials, adopted on 11 April 1996, urging member countries that allowed 
the tax deductibility of bribes to foreign public offi cials to re-examine this treatment with a view 
to denying the tax deductibility of such bribes. See: <http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,2340,
en_2649_34551_2048174_119672_1_1_37447,00.html> (accessed 3 May 2009).
61 Several authors describe the emergence of the FCPA and the effects of its lone status on the 
international scene. See B. Earle, ‘The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD Anti-
Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won’t Work, Try the Money Argument’ (1996) 14 
Dickson Journal of International Law 207. L. Low, ‘New Antibribery Rules Create New Compliance 
Responsibilities’ (1998) 26 International Business Lawyer 272; C. Corr and J. Lawler, ‘Damned if You 
Do, Damned if You Don’t? The OECD Convention and the Globalisation of Anti-Bribery Measures’ 
(1999) 32 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1249 at 1253.
62 P. Van Duyne, ‘Corruption: Acts and Attitudes’, in B. Huber (ed.), Combating Corruption in the 
European Union (Trier, Academy of European Law 2002) 1 at 13.
63 B. George, K. Lacey and J. Birmele, ‘On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global Anti-Bribery 
Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts toward the Reduction of 
Business Corruption’ (1999) 32 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 17.
64 See generally G. Abed (ed.), Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance (Washington, 
D.C., International Monetary Fund 2002). S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, 
Consequences and Reform (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999).
65 Some have argued that international corruption is a crime against humanity. See B. Ilias, ‘Corruption 
as an International Crime and Crime against Humanity: An Outline of Supplementary Criminal Justice 
Policies’ (2006) 4(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 466.
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the rule of law. Hildebrandt has remarked that, for a violated norm to regain its 
position as a guideline, the negation of the norm caused by its violation must be 
undone. Punitive interventions, she states, are the counteractions that nullify the 
initial action.66 The punitive reaction that sanctions as it stigmatises is characteristic 
of criminal law.67 International condemnation followed the path charted by the FCPA 
in a slew of international instruments criminalising international corruption.68
 In 1996, the Organization of American States adopted the Inter-American 
Convention against Corruption.69 Other instruments include the OECD Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi cials in International Business 
Transactions,70 the Council of Europe’s Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on 
Corruption,71 the Convention of the European Union on the Fight Against Corruption 
involving Offi cials of the European Communities or Offi cials of Member States,72 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime,73 the African Union 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption74 and, fi nally, the recent UN 
Convention Against Corruption.75
 The international instruments repudiating corruption have been implemented as 
required by member states under their domestic laws. The OECD convention, for 
example, provides in respect of international corruption that ‘… each Party shall take 
such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under 
its law…’.76 The thirty-six states parties to the OECD Convention have enacted 
implementing legislation criminalising transnational bribery.77 The EU Convention 
is also mandatory in its approach. It states that each member state ‘shall’ take the 
necessary measures to criminalise the active bribery of EU offi cials.78 It permits 
no exceptions in this respect.79 The UN Convention, which has been signed by 140 
countries and ratifi ed by 136, calls on parties to take measures establishing the act of 
international corruption as a criminal offence, subject to the principle of sovereign 
equality and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states.80
 The repudiation of international corruption at the level of international society 
has created a new common basis for interaction. The consensus necessary for such 
international rules refl ects the recognition of the rules at the level of the state. This 
66 Hildebrandt, above n. 51, at 20.
67 Criminal law has a defi nitional function. It helps to categorise certain acts as detrimental to the 
public good and therefore prohibited. Section 1.01 of the American Model Penal Code illustrates this 
when it states that ‘the general purposes of the provisions governing the defi nition of offences are: (a) 
to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifi ably and inexcusably infl icts or threatens substantial harm to 
individual or public interests…’.
68 This has been referred to as the ‘corruption eruption’. See M. Naim, ‘The Corruption Eruption’ 
(1995) 2(2) Brown Journal of World Affairs 245.
69 Inter-American Convention against Corruption (1996), 35 ILM 1996 at 724.
70 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi cials in International Business Transactions 
(1997), 37 ILM 1998 at 1 (hereinafter, the ‘OECD Convention’).
71 Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (1999), European Treaty Series No. 
173.
72 Convention on the Fight Against Corruption involving Offi cials of the European Communities or 
Offi cials of Member States of the European Union (1997), 37 ILM 1998 at 12; Offi cial Journal of the 
European Union 1997 C 195 (hereinafter, the ‘EU Convention’).
73 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 40(2) ILM 2001 at 353.
74 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 43(1) ILM 2004 at 5.
75 See above n. 9.
76 Art. 1 OECD Convention.
77 See the OECD’s website for details on the implementation of OECD Convention at: <http://www.
oecd.org/document/30/0,2340,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_1,00.html> (accessed 9 June 2009).
78 Art. 3(2) EU Convention.
79 Art. 15(2) EU Convention.
80 Art. 4 UN Convention against Corruption. A list of signatories and ratifi cations is available at: 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html> (accessed 9 June 2009).
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transnational agreement by states on rules repudiating international corruption refl ects 
a general acceptance of the negative consequences of international corruption for 
their individual and joint stability. The extent of this agreement is the reach of a new 
normative order. Within this framework, the fi ght against international corruption is 
no longer simply a matter of private agreement between parties or an issue left to 
be regulated by market forces.81 Criminalisation has introduced a moral and public 
tone into the fi ght against international corruption.82 World-wide criminalisation 
has put in place a ‘morally unassailable’83 ‘hypernorm’84 repudiating international 
commercial corruption.
 In this normative space, the constitutional principle of the rule of law is refl ected 
in the creation of an international framework of rules repudiating international 
corruption so as to restrict arbitrary action by competing interests. It is also refl ected 
in the equality created by tackling the corruption that undermines fair competition. 
The mechanism that allows for the submission of violations of the rules established 
by the international regulatory framework to domestic courts and independent 
processes of international arbitration is an integral aspect of the rule of law.
 The wide-reaching criminalisation of international corruption means that the 
relative, culture-specifi c perspective has given way, in certain aspects and to a certain 
extent, to a common standard.85 The emergence of the international framework of 
rules regulating international corruption has clarifi ed and given content to the legal 
concept of international corruption. The OECD Convention is representative of the 
defi nition of the offence of international corruption found in the various instruments 
and provides:
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under 
its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, 
whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public offi cial, for that offi cial or for a third 
party, in order that the offi cial act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of offi cial 
duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international 
business.86
The provisions dealing with international corruption deal with a very specifi c 
aspect of corruption and circumscribe this area with a certain degree of accuracy. 
They establish the substantive content of the crime of international corruption. 
For an international system of commerce confronted with varying legal traditions 
and standards, criminalisation is arguably a necessary fi rst step. It establishes the 
normative defi nition of international commercial corruption that makes possible the 
identifi cation and enforcement of infringed rights. In the absence of this fi rst step, the 
very notion of civil remedies would fl ounder in a sea of relativism. This limiting of 
the discourse to the unfair market competition argument certainly does not refl ect all 
the faces of or possible responses to corruption. However, the merit of limiting the 
81 See generally A. Makinwa, ‘Civil Remedies for International Corruption: The Role of International 
Arbitration’, in Meyer, above n. 23, 257 at 263-265.
82 See B. Bukovansky, ‘Corruption is Bad: Normative Dimensions of the Anti-Corruption Movement’, 
Working Paper No. 2002/5, Australian National University, Department of International Relations 
(2002) at 3, available at: <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir/pubs/work_papers/02-5.pdf> (accessed 9 June 
2009).
83 See B. Shaw, ‘The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally Unassailable’ (2000) 33 
Cornell International Law Journal 689.
84 Donaldson and Dunfee remark that hypernorms constitute principles so fundamental that, by 
defi nition, they serve as ‘second-order’ norms by which lower order norms are to be judged. See 
Donaldson and Dunfee, above n. 38, at 50.
85 A. Makinwa, ‘The Rules Regulating Transnational Bribery: Achieving a Common Standard?’ 
(2007) 1 International Business Law Journal 17.
86 Art. 1 OECD Convention.
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fi eld of enquiry to the scope provided by the normative framework on international 
corruption is that it enables a coherent analysis of one aspect of what is generally 
accepted to be a multifaceted, multi-value phenomenon.
 In summary, researching the potential of civil remedies for combating international 
corruption requires a research strategy that looks outward and accepts that a plurality 
of legal systems must interact in community to create shared values. It also accepts 
the need for a normative starting point that enables a discourse across legal cultures. 
It accepts that, while legal cultures, principles and concepts may differ, pragmatism 
dictates that a community bounded by mutual self-interest will develop common 
solutions to common problems. This is the motivation for the choice of the functional 
comparative method for this research, which is discussed in the following section.
4 The Functional Comparative Approach
Comparison is a part of human nature.87 In legal research, comparative law may 
occur at the macro level, involving the comparison of entire legal systems, or at the 
micro level, involving the comparison of particular elements or issues of selected 
legal systems.88 Comparison may be viewed as an end in itself in the search for 
common principles or as a means to achieve insight into the reaction of legal systems 
to common problems. Comparative law can serve many purposes depending on the 
purpose for which it is being used. It starts from a given problem or issue, and it is 
this ‘main purpose for which … comparative study or research is undertaken [that] 
will to a large extent dictate the choice of legal systems or topics to compare and the 
method of comparison.’89
 The ends of the comparative method are described variously as serving as an aid to 
legislation and law reform, as a tool of construction, as a means of understanding legal 
rules or as a means of contributing to the systematic unifi cation or harmonisation of 
law.90 The aim of this research on civil remedies for international corruption focuses 
essentially on the urgent question of how the problem of international corruption 
can be curtailed. This issue calls for a re-examination of the question why existing 
methods and concepts have not yet provided the desired decreases in international 
corruption. The use of comparison in this project will therefore be undertaken with 
the objective of: (1) understanding the existing position regarding civil remedies 
for international corruption; (2) examining the extent to which the existing position 
can make realisable the goals of international anti-corruption legislation; and (3) 
proposing what needs to be done if there is a gap between the position as it is and 
the position that may be needed for more effective recourse against international 
corruption from the perspective of the use of civil remedies.
 In the case of a problem of international dimension, such as civil remedies for 
international corruption, the immediate problem of the comparatist is how to compare 
apples with apples and not oranges. How are comparisons of differing value systems 
to be undertaken? How are comparisons of laws set in different social, historical 
87 John Hall once remarked that ‘[t]o be sapiens is to be comparatist’. See J. Hall, Comparative Law 
and Social Theory (New York, Vail-Ballow Press, Inc. 1963) 9.
88 P. De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (London, Cavendish Publishing 1995) at 224-
226.
89 W. Kamba, ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework’ (1974) 23 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 485 at 489.
90 De Cruz, above n. 88, at 17.
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and economic stages valid? How does one bridge the differences of language and 
concepts?91 Reitz refers to this as the ‘enigma of translation’.92
 In their seminal work, Zweigert and Kotz tackle this issue head on. They declare 
that the basic methodological principle of comparative law is ‘functionality’, which 
they argue rests on the fact that ‘the legal system of every society faces essentially 
the same problems and solves these problems by quite different means though very 
often with similar results’.93 The functional comparative method differs from other 
comparative approaches in that it focuses not so much on the rules themselves but 
on the response of a legal system to a particular problem. Unlike the study of legal 
transplants or comparative legal history, where deeper insight is sought into the rules 
themselves, the functional comparative method focuses on the organic responses of 
legal systems. It is the response that is identifi ed and compared.
 Defi ning the problem that requires a common solution is at the heart of comparative 
analysis. By defi ning the problem, one has a reference point for comparison.94 Only 
responses to the same problem possess the necessary basis for comparison.95 The 
functional comparative method facilitates a cross-cultural analysis of ‘solutions’ 
provided by particular systems.96 Rheinstein, describing the functional approach, 
remarks that it addresses how ‘the problems set by life, … the actual confl icts of 
social interests [are] solved by the legal order…’.97 Such a comparison, he states, very 
often shows that different legal systems may use different technical means for the 
same purpose.98 In his opinion, functional comparative analysis ‘fi nds a particularly 
important application in legislative reform, where it shows how a given problem 
demanding a reform at home is solved abroad. In our modern world, the problems 
demanding regulation by law are alike, often identical in many countries, especially 
in countries of a similar economic structure.’99
 To put it in simplistic terms, the primary question that the functionalist asks is: 
‘what would you do?’ As opposed to: ‘what is your rule?’, ‘what is your legal history?’ 
or ‘what is your legal culture?’ The study of legal responses occurs very naturally in 
international trade, where the primary force for cohesion is the agreement between 
contracting parties. The question ‘what would you do?’ is very quickly followed by 
‘this is how we do it – how can we work together?’ Functional comparison is the 
substance of this discussion. It is very much a means to an end and not an end in 
itself.
91 Legrand discusses this problem of translation at length. See P. Legrand, ‘How to Compare Now’ 
(1996) 16 Legal Studies 232 at 234 ff.
92 He points out that ‘In one sense every term can be translated because there are things in each 
legal system that are roughly the functional equivalent of things in the other legal system. In another 
sense nothing can be translated because the equivalents are different in ways that matter at least for 
some purposes. At a minimum, generally equivalent terms in each language often have different fi elds 
of associated meaning …’. J. Reitz, ‘How To Do Comparative Law’ (1998) 46 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 617 at 620-621.
93 K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law, translated from the German by Tony 
Weir (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1998, 3rd ed.) at 34.
94 See R. Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’, in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2006) at 339.
95 Zweigert and Kotz, above n. 93, at 34.
96 Rosenblum remarks that ‘[c]omparative law holds signifi cant potential to understand how nations 
internalise international norms.’ See D. Rosenblum, ‘Internalizing Gender: Why International Law 
Theory Should Adopt Comparative Methods’ (2006-2007) 45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
759 at 770.
97 M. Rheinstein, ‘Comparative Law and Confl ict of Laws in Germany’ (1934-1935) 2 University of 
Chicago Law Review 232 at 248.
98 Id.
99 Id., at 249.
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 The functional comparative approach realises that there are many roads that lead to 
Rome. Each road is distinct and unique, and there might be similarities or differences 
in their construction, but they all serve the same purpose, namely getting to Rome. 
In this approach, the focus is not on analysing the road but rather on identifying the 
roads that lead to Rome and how it is done. The emphasis remains on the process of 
building and confl uence and not necessarily in the identifi cation or discovery of a 
single road.
 The result of the process of functional comparison is to reveal differences but 
also – more importantly – commonalities. Rheinstein points out that, while each 
legal system may use certain fundamental concepts in order to express its rules, 
and these concepts often differ in different legal systems, comparative observation 
may reveal how little such concepts constitute ends in themselves.100 Rheinstein sees 
these concepts as ‘nothing but blocks with which to build structures.’101 He touches 
on the essence of functionalism when he states that it ‘will show us the variety of 
means which may be and have been used for the same purposes, thus enlarging our 
“stock of solutions”.’102
 In this view, the functional comparative method can provide an element of 
predictability. The international rules that stipulate civil remedies for corruption do 
not give content or defi nition to these remedies. The rules present concepts such as 
‘victim’, ‘damage’, ‘compensation’ and ‘invalid contracts’, which are in themselves 
complex in nature. As such, exploratory research of an analytical and conceptual 
character is necessary in order to translate and give content to these concepts. The 
functional comparative method does not resolve the problem of translation, but, by 
focusing on function rather than content, it can provide a picture of the position on 
civil remedies for international corruption in various jurisdictions. Starting from the 
problem enables a certain detachment from particular concepts, substantive laws or 
procedures in cases where they arrive at ‘more or less the same result’.103 In this way, 
the functional comparative method enables the identifi cation of various solutions to 
the question of civil remedies for international corruption. These solutions provide 
the contours of civil remedies for international corruption, i.e. its building blocks.
 It must be accepted that the identifi cation of building blocks only provides a 
pointer as to the direction of legal development. The functional comparative approach 
allows for the identifi cation of the basic elements at play; how they operate within the 
selected national systems; the extent of their compatibility or incompatibility; and 
how, if at all, they are likely to infl uence the ‘common platform’. However, there are 
limits to this method. It points the way to a possible consensus but may not in itself 
discover a ‘common rule’. As Palmer points out, ‘the discovery of transnational rules 
or “common concepts”, which has been almost a slogan of professional comparative 
study since the 1900 Paris Congress, will be diffi cult to discover through functional 
analysis … while functionality is a factor, it is not even the main factor in the 
assessment of optimal doctrines.’104 The existence of a common solution does not 
necessarily imply the identifi cation of a universally acceptable rule. The pragmatism 
of the solution is coloured by the infl uence of power and politics. The history of 
the international regulatory framework for international corruption described above 
shows how a domestic American norm prevailed, due to intense politicking by the 
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Reitz points out that ‘By asking how one legal system may achieve more or less the same result 
as another legal system without using the same terminology or even the same rule or procedure, the 
comparatist is pushed to appreciate the interrelationships between various areas of law, including 
especially the relationships between substantive law and procedure.’ See Reitz, above n. 92, at 622.
104 V. Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ (2005) 
53 American Journal of Comparative Law 261 at 284.
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US government, as the basis for the international normative standard. The triumph 
of the American norm repudiating corruption represents a confl uence of power and 
strategy that has set the tone in the fi ght against international corruption.
 The functional comparative method can provide a window on to how the law 
is likely to develop in response to articulated problems of international dimension. 
Beyond this point lies the unpredictability of political interests. While it may 
indeed not identify a universally applicable rule on civil remedies for international 
corruption, the functional comparative method can point to the likely shape of 
a common position by presenting a ‘basket of solutions’ that provides us with a 
perimeter within which such a common position on civil remedies is likely to take 
occur.
4.1 The Process of Comparison105
There is no supranational body charged with the enforcement of private suits 
for damage suffered as a result of international corruption. This means that 
implementation will necessarily have to occur via domestic legal structures. As such, 
a logical starting point for inquiry is at the domestic level, where the right to civil 
redress for international corruption can exist as an enforceable right.
 Civil remedies, proceeding as they do from the individual, are closely linked to 
local customs, attitudes and practices. The diversity of such practices means that a 
‘view from nowhere’106 may fall short of reality. Our notions of civil remedies are 
limited by the constraints of national legal systems. In this sense, international rules 
and concepts are constrained by the limits of those systems.
 Freeman points out that the law is normative but also factual, as is the degree of 
compliance with the law.107 Researching civil remedies for corruption thus implies a 
move from the normative demand that states ought to provide the means for victims 
of corruption to seek remedies to the substance of how such remedies are provided in 
the implementation and interpretation of the norm. This process raises two important 
questions. Firstly, what systems should form the basis of the comparison? Secondly, 
what should the parameters of the comparison be?
4.2 The Systems for Comparison
It could be argued that the question of civil remedies for international corruption 
cannot be answered without having detailed information about the system of 
international trade and all its participants. Since most countries in the world are 
involved in international commerce, this would be a weighty task. However, this 
may not be a valid argument, as not all players in a system necessarily play a similar 
role in the emergence of the rules that shape it. There is a defi nite politics of rule 
making in which traditional confi gurations of power and statehood play an important 
105 Expression adopted from Kamba, above n. 89, at 510.
106 Donaldson and Dunfee point out that the ‘pivotal traditions of ethical theory, when applied in 
diluted form to real world problems, have offered a “view from nowhere”. They have been incapable 
of locating the complex, particular problems of corporations, industries, economic systems, marketing 
strategies, etc., in a way that would provide an institutional “somewhere”.’ See Donaldson and Dunfee, 
above n. 38, at 13. The authors adopted this phrase from the illuminating book by T. Nagel. The View 
from Nowhere (New York, Oxford University Press 1986).
107 M. Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Cambridge, UK/Malden, US, Polity 
Press 2002) at 77.
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role. The experience of the emergence of criminal rules regulating international 
corruption, and the central role played by the United States in this regard, underscores 
the infl uence of political interest.
 The selection of countries for comparison is guided by the problem at hand. 
International corruption is an issue of international commercial law. The language of 
commerce is heavily infl uenced by the Western tradition. As Watson points out ‘… 
virtually every country in the world has borrowed most of its commercial law from 
a few legal systems, particularly French and German civil law and English common 
law.’108 These legal systems remain the foundation of the commercial laws of states 
and from a pragmatic point of view are the logical focus of a comparative study to 
determine the direction that the issue of civil remedies for international corruption 
may take. This fact narrows the discourse by excluding religious traditions such as 
Islamic and Hindu law, traditions of the Far East such as the Chinese and Japanese 
systems and other legal traditions such as African, Russian or unclassifi able systems.
 The selection of countries for study is also guided by the history of the development 
of the anti-corruption regulatory framework. The US has played a pre-eminent role. 
Its position in the world economy, coupled with its historical role in the regulation 
of international corruption, makes it an important indicator on the question of civil 
remedies for international corruption that may exert a great infl uence on reform.
 Thus, as far as the question of civil remedies for international corruption is 
concerned, the functional comparative analysis of countries representing the civil 
and common law systems as well as a consideration of US law can help to identify 
concepts that may serve as building blocks that point to the shape of possible 
regulation on this issue.109 Does such recourse to legal systems of the Western 
tradition provide a suffi cient platform on which to accommodate the global need to 
fi ght corruption? Can other traditions provide a more effective methodology? With 
a problem as complex as corruption, there can be no exclusiveness of approach. The 
market-based approach to fi ghting international corruption is directed at the specifi c 
aspect of international commercial corruption. Different approaches or strategies 
may be needed for other aspects of corruption, such as, for example, political or 
petty corruption. This implies a plurality of strategies. Indeed, the idea of a single 
strategy to fi ght corruption may miss the mark to the extent that the various types 
of corruption are driven by different factors. It is important to identify the different 
streams and faces of corruption and tailor the medicine to the underlying causes.
4.3 Parameters for Comparison
Kamba proposes a three-stage process of comparison that comprises a descriptive 
phase, an identifi cation phase and an explanatory phase.110 This process is derived, 
in his words, from the fact that comparison ‘entails not merely the ascertainment of 
divergences and resemblances between the legal systems or parts of the legal systems 
compared, but also the explanation of such divergences and resemblances.’111 This 
108 A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Athens, University of Georgia 
Press 1974, 2nd ed.).
109 This research project also uses decisions of the European Court of Justice in developing its 
methodology. The role of the ECJ in shaping Community law requires a move away from national 
to autonomous interpretations of concepts guided by the objectives of the European Union. This can 
in some ways be likened to the autonomous ‘common platforms’ desired in the international trading 
system.
110 Kamba, above n. 89, at 511-512.
111 Id., at 511.
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systematic approach allows for the identifi cation of the basic elements at play; how 
they operate within the selected national systems; the extent of their compatibility or 
incompatibility; and how, if at all, they are likely to infl uence the ‘common platform’.
 The fi rst step of the descriptive phase of functional analysis is to ascertain the 
existing state of affairs under the legal systems chosen for comparison. This can 
be done by examining the solutions presented by the chosen legal systems to the 
two principal requirements regarding civil remedies for international corruption 
contained in the UN Convention and the Civil Law Convention, which cover two 
areas: the right to sue and transaction validity.
 The classic private right to bring an action for harm or damage caused is a 
new fl ank in the fi ght against corruption that has been opened up by the Civil Law 
Convention and the UN Convention. Persons who have suffered damage as a result 
of corrupt activity are to be given the right to sue for compensation. Article 3 of the 
Civil Law Convention provides that every party to the Convention ‘shall provide 
in its internal law for persons who have suffered damage as a result of corruption 
to have the right to initiate an action in order to obtain full compensation for such 
damage.’112 Such compensation may cover material damage, loss of profi ts and non-
pecuniary loss.113 The UN Convention for its part requires that ‘each State Party 
shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with principles of 
its domestic law, to ensure that entities or persons who have suffered damage as a 
result of an act of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings against those 
responsible for that damage in order to obtain compensation.’114 This private right to 
enforce anti-corruption rules by suing for harm suffered changes the dynamic of the 
fi ght against corruption by bringing in the victims of corruption as active participants 
in the sanctioning process.
 The second aspect of the civil recourse presented by the international instruments 
fl ows from the fact that most jurisdictions now have measures in place criminalising 
international corruption. To allow persons to benefi t from contracts resulting from 
such criminal transactions contradicts the logic of the international rules. What is the 
effect of corruption on contracts arising from or tainted by international corruption? 
The Civil Law Convention and UN Convention propose that the presence of 
corruption should play a role in determining the validity of the contracts concerned.
 Article 8 of the Civil Law Convention provides that ‘each Party shall provide in 
its internal law for any contract or clause of a contract providing for corruption to 
be null and void.’ Instances where the contract itself does not provide for corruption 
but is the result of corrupt activity also fall within the scope of the Convention. 
Article 8(2) of the Civil Law Convention provides that ‘each Party shall provide in 
its internal law for the possibility for all parties to a contract whose consent has been 
undermined by an act of corruption to be able to apply to the court for the contract 
to be declared void, notwithstanding their right to claim for damages.’ Similarly, 
Article 34 of the UN Convention requires its parties to consider corruption as a 
‘relevant factor’ in legal proceedings relating to the validity of contracts, the grant or 
withdrawal of a concession or similar instrument or other remedial action.115
 The descriptive phase uses these international stipulations to assess the degree to 
which the objectives under the international framework can or cannot be achieved by 
the existing national systems. This exercise helps to identify areas of development 
and/or reconciliation. How does this comparison take place? Simply placing the 
112 Art. 3(1) Civil Law Convention.
113 Art. 3(2) Civil Law Convention.
114 Art. 35 UN Convention.
115 Art. 34 UN Convention.
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national laws next to the international stipulations may not convey how these rules 
infl uence or fi t within the decision and rule-making process.116
 This research project has chosen parameters for comparison drawn from the 
interface between the rules and the societies in which they operate. The Civil Law 
Convention on Corruption and the UN Convention against Corruption establish a 
broad framework by stating that nations should provide victims of corruption with 
‘the right to initiate legal proceedings’117 on the one hand and provide ‘effective 
remedies’118 on the other. The interpretation of the European Court of Justice of 
similar phrasing in other instruments provides two helpful parameters.119
 The fi rst parameter is the extent to which states have taken measures that can 
be effectively relied upon before national courts to ensure that the objectives of the 
UN Convention and the Civil Law Convention are realised. The European Court 
of Justice, interpreting Article 6 of Council Directive 76/207, which provides that 
‘all persons who consider themselves wronged by discrimination between men and 
women must have an effective judicial remedy’, stated that this article requires 
member states to introduce into their internal legal systems such measures as are 
needed to enable all persons who consider themselves wronged by discrimination 
to pursue their claims by judicial process. The Court found that it followed from 
this provision that member states must take measures that are suffi ciently effective 
to achieve the aim of the directive and that they must ensure that the rights thus 
conferred may be effectively relied upon before the national courts by the persons 
concerned.120
 The second parameter is the extent to which the courts give a positive 
interpretation of existing rules and principles within the legal system in a manner 
that gives effect to the rights of persons to claim redress for damage caused by 
intentional corruption. The European Court of Justice, referring to ‘effectiveness’ in 
the context of Community law, has stated that it is for member states to establish a 
system of legal remedies and procedures that ensure respect for the right to effective 
judicial protection and, in that context, to interpret and apply national procedural 
rules governing the exercise of rights of action in a way that enables natural and 
legal persons to challenge before the court the legality of any decision or other 
national measure relative to the application to them of a Community act of general 
application.121
 A third parameter, adapted from the work of Willem van Boom, examines the 
extent to which existing laws within the system under comparison are actually 
used to attain the objectives of the international conventions. The focus here is on 
compliance. Van Boom states that the ‘effi cacy of enforcement of substantive private 
law rules depends on the availability of a remedy and how it is used in practice.’ 
Thus, he states, ‘a remedy ensuring maximum compliance in theory, which is hardly 
used in practice … lacks effi cacy.’122
116 Legrand castigates what he refers to as the ‘narrow view of the comparative enterprise’, which is 
reduced to a ‘dry juxtaposition of the rules of one legal culture … with those of another’. Legrand, 
above n. 91, at 234.
117 Art. 35 UN Convention.
118 Art. 1 Civil Law Convention.
119 The European Court of Justice provides helpful insights because of its pre-eminent role in ensuring 
equality before the law for members of the European Union and its duty to provide uniform and binding 
interpretation for member states that represent different legal families.
120 Case 222/84, Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1986] 
ECR 1651.
121 Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council of the European Union, [2002] ECR 
I-6677.
122 W. van Boom, ‘Effi cacious Enforcement in Contract and Tort’ (2006) Erasmus Law Lectures 11.
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 The comparisons in the descriptive phase set the stage for the identifi cation 
phase where areas of commonality and dissonance are identifi ed. The last phase, the 
explanatory phase, seeks to explain the rationale and implications of these areas of 
agreement and disagreement for the attainment of civil remedies for international 
corruption.123 The use of the functional comparative method in this manner provides 
an element of predictability in the identifi cation of the possible confi guration of 
the ‘common platform’ of interaction in respect of civil remedies for international 
corruption.
5 Concluding remarks
Corruption is an impediment to the sustainable development of nations. In a world that 
is ultimately a closed system, no country is an island or immune from its devastating 
consequences. Corruption is a multi-faceted problem, and a plurality of strategies 
may be needed to address its various aspects. For research into civil remedies for 
international corruption, a normative starting point is provided by the regulatory 
framework criminalising international corruption. This framework represents a 
consensus so broad that it is viewed as a hypernorm that acts as a second-order 
norm by which lower (national) norms are validated. It adopts a market approach to 
fi ghting international corruption and is centred on the unfair competition caused by 
bribery in international trading transactions.
 The approach taken in this research project on civil remedies for international 
corruption is to limit its remit to the scope of the international normative framework 
regarding international corruption. The advantage of such a fi eld-limiting approach 
is that is it allows for a coherent analysis and establishes a starting point for 
research across a plurality of values embraced by the many cultures that comprise 
the international trading system. Indeed, for the question of civil remedies for 
international corruption to be posed at all, there must be specifi c content to the 
meaning of international corruption. Without such a baseline, the research question 
would be stymied in a ‘sea of relativism’ and would be limited, at best, to national 
formulations.
 This paper asserts that the methodology to be adopted in researching such a 
question of international dimension is infl uenced by the rule-making process of the 
largely autonomous society of trading nations. A primary concern in this regard is how 
‘common rules’ can be arrived at in cases where an issue cuts across legal traditions 
and cultures. This concern is addressed by the reality that the enforced coexistence 
of countries results in a zone of shared rationalities. Mutually dependent interactions 
require trust, certainty and predictability. Participants in this society must fashion 
binding objective rules, particularly in the face of increasingly integrated markets, in 
order to interact effi ciently.
 The logic of the international trading order requires the certainty of the rule 
of law. This is the driving force for the constant formulation of common rules to 
regulate the expanding sphere of commercial activity beyond state borders. The 
process of rule formulation proceeds from problem to problem as states coordinate 
their responses in the framework of their mutually dependent relationships. The 
methodology adopted in this research on civil remedies for international corruption 
focuses on the identifi cation, comparison and analysis of these responses. This 
method of comparison is functional and pragmatic.
 The functional comparative method does not resolve the problems of translation 
inherent in researching issues with an international dimension. However, by focusing 
on the pragmatism of the solutions presented in the responses of legal systems to a 
123 This three-stage approach is borrowed from Kamba, above n. 89, at 510-512.
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particular shared problem, it can provide a deeper understanding of the nature of 
the legal problem concerned. It also provides a window on the ‘building blocks’ or 
concepts that may infl uence the shape of a ‘common platform’. The source of these 
building blocks will depend on the nature of the problem being researched. In the 
case of international corruption, the primary role that the Western legal tradition has 
played and continues to play in shaping the regulatory framework for international 
commerce provides a strong motivation to choose examples from the principal 
common and civil law systems within this tradition as subjects for comparison. The 
American legal system, which served as a catalyst for the current framework of 
rules regulating international corruption, is also a logical and important point of 
comparison.
 The process of comparison itself should be much more than a dry analysis of 
‘juxtaposed’ rules. Rather, it should refl ect the systems, processes and solutions of 
the legal systems chosen for analysis. This research project has chosen as parameters 
for comparison the extent to which society provides recourse to civil remedies, 
interprets provisions in a manner conducive to the pursuit of such remedies and 
uses such remedies to assuage the harm suffered by citizens. This approach helps 
to identify a framework of solutions that provides an element of predictability and 
may highlight areas of ‘shared understanding’ that can infl uence the development 
of an international approach towards the question of civil remedies for international 
corruption.
 To a certain extent, the functional comparative method addresses the 
methodological problems associated with research into issues of international 
dimension. It is certainly an important tool in the determination and development 
of the rules of interaction that are needed to preserve the stability and effectiveness 
of the international trading system. To this end, the functional comparative method 
is not just a dry legal analysis but is responsive, dynamic and pragmatic. It is most 
useful where it paints a vivid picture of the interaction between the cultures, legal 
traditions, economies and – indeed – political practices of the legal systems chosen 
for comparison as they respond to the shared problem that forms the basis of the 
research question.
